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Imperial dialectics and epistemic mapping: 
From decolonisation to anti-Eurocentric IR 
 
… Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference 
between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”). This 
vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in there 
world, “we” lived in ours. The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other 
going.  
-Edward Said (1979: 43-44) 
 
The “global,” then, often seems to be a geopolitical placeholder, a term signifying not (or not only) 
Western.  
-Duncan Bell (2013: 256) 
 
A durable tendency of International Relations (IR) scholarship in the last fifteen years 
has been to promote the addition of ‘non-Western’ ideas, practices, and histories to 
correct disciplinary Eurocentrism.i This article argues that this is not a solution, but a 
significant part of the problem. Rather than producing a global discipline, or a 
discipline more attuned to power in the production of knowledge, the addition of the 
non-Western as a distinct category of thought and practice contributes to an 
ethnification of world political inquiry. This reproduces a hierarchical imperial 
imaginary: a divided image of the world based on essentialised constructions of 
ethnic and cultural difference.  
 The problem often begins with essentialised conceptions of empire and ‘the 
Western.’ Reviving the critiques of some mid-20th century anticolonial nationalists, 
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anti-Eurocentric critics tend to reduce empire to its oppressive, exclusionist, or 
assimilationist practices. While empires could be all of these things, critics tend to 
ignore or diminish the productive role of empires in enabling the politics of 
identitarian difference (Cooper, 2005: 23). Rather than merely excluding, these 
politics formed the basis for elite post-colonial expertise and representation (Said 
1979; Kelly and Kaplan, 2001; Shaw, 2002; Muppidi, 2012). The conflation of empire 
with the West therefore obfuscates the designs and coexistence of non-Western 
empires and would-be empires.   
 Critics also tend to accept an ahistorical and essentialist vision of the Western 
as representing secular rationalism. An image is thus produced of Western IR as 
lacking its cultural, spiritual, or relational other half: a lack which the non-Western 
must be brought in to correct (e.g. Shahi and Ascione, 2016). While pointing out the 
limitations of the Western/non-Western binary is not new (e.g. Doty, 1996; Grovogui, 
2006; Bilgin, 2008; Shilliam, 2010; Hutchings, 2011), many scholars still seem 
resigned to it as a necessary tool which will eventually produce a more inclusive 
discipline somewhere down the line.ii The fundamental claim of this article is that 
adding ethnicised or culturalist representations of non-Western traits will never 
deliver a global or post-imperial IR. Adding ethnic and cultural variations on IR 
concepts such as sovereignty, agency, or cosmopolitanism contributes to a world 
divided by imperial categories, and props up the subordinate power claims of local 
universalisms. A fuller and more complex picture of humanity is denied in favour of 
stereotypes. Transversal processes of co-constitution and strategic alliance-making 
are obscured by representations of autogenous difference. 
  This article argues that projects to add the non-Western should be understood 
as a dimension of difference assertion internal to dialectical relations with hegemonic 
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knowledge formations. By this I do not mean to redeploy the well-established and 
over simplistic critique that any counter-hegemonic assertion of cultural difference is 
orientalist or an instance of self-imposed alienation (e.g. Chibber, 2013). Rather, that 
epistemic difference should be understood as part of a non-linear process of 
representation, which is not autonomous from the uneven political terrain on which 
global North and South, or ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ race relations take place.     
 While many IR scholars now recognise the need to situate approaches to 
world politics in more historical and relational analysis, this article seeks to make a 
contribution to how more historical and relational analysis should be approached 
when it comes to legacies of imperial hierarchy. Developing an interpretive analysis 
of anti-imperial intellectual history and recent anti-Eurocentric IR scholarship, this 
article offers a critique of how the Western and non-Western are represented by our 
current scholarly discourse. Building out from this critique, I draw on the writing and 
political biographies of William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) Du Bois and Frantz 
Fanon to advance two concepts: epistemic mapping and imperial dialectics. I 
approach Du Bois and Fanon comparatively, as two generations of theorists 
attempting to address the problems of an imperial world order. Like contemporary 
critics of Eurocentric IR, Du Bois and Fanon wrote from the global South against 
dominant Western knowledge formations. Their anti-imperial struggles sometimes 
elicited, what I call, epistemic mapping: a claimed ownership or close association 
between particular ways of thinking, seeing, or knowing the world with particular 
places, imagined communities, or social identities and subjectivities. However, Du 
Bois and Fanon deployed these constructions of the non-Western as part of reflexive 
and changing tactics embedded in their evolving anti-imperial strategies. They each 
shifted from the politics of ethno-cultural particularism, precisely because of the 
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inability of these politics to sustain anti-imperial momentum after the Second World 
War and African decolonisation. For Fanon more explicitly, representations of 
difference were inextricable from imperial dialectics: historical social formations 
which result from imperial encounters and changing political conjunctures, and which 
should not be taken for universal, timeless, or generic relations between coloniser 
and colonised. The significance of this for inquiry is that representations of the 
Western and non-Western are co-constituted, subject to social and political relations 
which are multi-axial, and are strongly determined by historical developments.  
 By contrast with Fanon and the later Du Bois, many contemporary scholars 
construct the non-Western as a concrete corrective to Eurocentrism. This is because 
knowledge institutions such as the modern university tend to incentivise the 
reification of different definable and coexisting knowledge genres (Said, 1979; 
Mamdani, 2012; see Berrey, 2015; Reus-Smit, 2017). Such a practice would have 
been recognisable to Fanon as either belonging to a particular moment of subaltern 
self-assertion, or the conservative cultural nationalist politics of the anti-colonial right. 
In arguing for the addition of the non-Western to the Western, in order to get the 
global or the post-imperial, contemporary scholars reproduce the ethnicised 
definitions and arguments for coexistence of cultural nationalists. Against the stated 
intentions of some anti-Eurocentric IR scholars,iii this results in conceptions of non-
Western difference which have historically serviced the interests of experts and 
national elites within an imperial world order. Thus the practice of epistemic mapping 
in contemporary inquiry evinces a form of imperial dialectics which exists in our own 
disciplinary ontologies and frames of analysis.  
 The remainder of this article is comprised of three sections and a conclusion. 
The first section situates Du Bois and Fanon within the context of the imperial ‘Black 
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Atlantic’, and draws on their anti-imperial politics to reveal the production of a 
hierarchical and divided political imaginary. The second section shows how this 
imperial imaginary is reproduced in contemporary academic discourse. The third 
section draws on Du Bois’s and Fanon’s anti-imperial world politics: their concerns 
about identitarian politics and their advocacy of internationalism and cultural 
revolution. The article concludes by briefly suggesting alternative ways forward.  
   
The imperial division of the world 
The past decade and a half has seen major corrections to the ‘wilful forgetting’ of 
empire by what has traditionally been a Eurocentric or predominantly ‘American 
social science.’iv The ‘re-turn to empire in IR’ is now well underway, with a rich, 
growing literature on the various forms of connection between empire, world politics, 
international order, and the discipline of IR itself (Bayly, 2014; e.g. Keene, 2002; 
Inayattullah and Blaney, 2004; Shilliam, 2010; Vitalis, 2015; Thakur, et. al., 2017). 
Yet there remain limits to the extent to which the imperial frame of analysis can so 
far be construed as ‘reconstructive’ rather than simply ‘additive’ (see Pasha, 2010: 
218). This is particularly the case when it comes to the question of how to 
conceptualise notions of identity, subjectivity, and difference which are historically 
rooted in imperial relations. While several scholars now call for inclusion of the non-
Western to address Eurocentric erasures and violence, far fewer seem fully ready to 
acknowledge that such addition requires equal attention to the problem of 
representation in our scholarly practice. Representations of the non-Western in 
contradistinction to the Western are inherent to anti-Eurocentric IR scholarship, yet 
these representations also have origins in the imperial division of the world.  
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 The anti-imperial archive serves as a crucial yet still under-utilised resource in 
addressing these issues. While some critical IR scholars draw on specific works and 
concepts by certain anti-imperial thinkers, few studies read these through a longer 
historical trajectory of critical thought on empire and situate it in relation to its social 
world. As a consequence it becomes too easy to associate certain works, concepts, 
or thinkers with a transhistorical, non-Western perspective. To be fair, it is only 
relatively recently that political theorists have begun to situate the writings of 
canonical Western thinkers in relation to their social world (see Valdez, 2017). What 
such an approach can reveal is that claims to epistemic difference are not entirely 
new, but have resonances with past political efforts to integrate ethno-culturally 
different societies into a connected and unequal world order. Thus epistemic 
difference should not be seen simply as a reflection of an externally existing reality, 
but as a process of representation which is power laden and dialectical.  
 The categories which would eventually evolve into a rhetorical commonplace 
of West/East or West/non-West were born bound up in contestation over the 
meaning of ethno-cultural difference within a world order divided by empires (Said, 
1979; 1993; Doty, 1996; Salter, 2002; Aydin, 2007; Biswas, 2007; Barkawi, 2010; Go 
and Lawson, 2017).v The imperial division of the world was both discursive and 
material. Writing for a UNESCO conference in 1972, Amílcar Cabral argued that 
colonial social genesis and fragmentation were the result of ‘imperialist capital’, 
which 
 
imposed new kind of relations on the indigenous society, imparting to it a more 
complex structure, and engendered, fostered, sharpened, or resolved 
contradictions and social conflicts… it gave birth to new nations based on 
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human groupings or peoples at different stages of development. [2016 (1972)]: 
160-161] 
 
 The territories in Africa and the ‘new world’, which would become associated 
with pan-African and black radical politics, were differentiated by imperial capital and 
forced labour flows in various ways (e.g. Williams, 1994 [1944]; Hopkins, 1973; 
Rodney, 1982; Gilroy, 1993; Jones, 2005; Shilliam, 2009). African territories were 
differentiated between coastal societies, which had centuries of engagement with 
outsiders, and inland societies, which were sometimes understood to have remained 
more traditionally African (Shumway, 2014). Within coastal and inland societies, 
there was further differentiation between tribal elites, the Western-educated middle 
classes, and different segments of the masses. There were also differentiations 
between colonies, which reflected not only their respective European rulers, but their 
various uses and importance for imperial extraction, security, and administration. 
Thus, the experiences of colonial subjects in Senegal and the Gold Coast differed 
from those of Jamaica, Martinique, or St. Kitts. Though not colonial subjects 
nominally, the societies and politics of African Americans, linked as they were to the 
Atlantic slave trade, were also shaped by imperial-colonial structures of relation.  
 The imperial politics of division were not either assimilationist or exclusionist. 
Rather, they worked to include different classes of ‘native’ populations in different 
ways (Anghie, 2007; Cooper, 2014; Getachew, 2019). For example, at the height of 
imperial confidence during the mid-19th century, Britain advanced policies to 
assimilate West Africans through ‘commerce and Christianity’, and train them in 
bureaucratic, military, and legal professions as future leaders of a ‘civilised’ Africa to 
come (Zachernuk, 2000: 44). Later and in different contexts, empires implemented 
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policies of non-intervention or indirect rule. These policies could provide alibis for the 
perceived futility of trying to convert and incorporate natives, or were designed to 
maintain control within a rationale of preserving indigenous culture (Crowder, 1964; 
Mantena, 2010; Mamdani, 2012). By the early 20th century, there existed a 
transnational class of colonial elites, lobbying for greater access to positions of 
authority and influence within the imperial network. When policies of indirect rule 
were established after WWI, many of these elites were denied leadership roles on 
the grounds that they failed to authentically represent the cultures of their people. 
Meanwhile, representatives of ‘traditional’ culture, religion, and politics could rule 
with relative autonomy over local communities. Colonial officials who believed 
themselves experts on native culture were often open to manipulation by these 
representatives (Parsons, 2014: 8, 20). 
 These strategies of imperial division elicited different types of difference claim. 
The two categories of difference claim that frame the remainder of the discussion 
can be termed the particular as universal and the particular as particular. While the 
particular as universal asserts difference to both resist assimilation and emphasise 
shared humanity, the logic of the particular as particular is to emphasise essential 
difference to establish autonomy (cf. Paipais, 2011). Rather than necessarily 
sequential, or abstractly opposed or harmonious, these two types of claim are 
subject to processes of dialectical engagement between actors within connected and 
unequal social orders. This tension can be seen in the scholarship and activism of 
Du Bois and Fanon, and is reproduced in contemporary anti-Eurocentric scholarship.  
  
Epistemic mapping - self-definition against and for empire 
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The image of Europe as a realm of material success, scientific discovery, 
democracy, and secular rationalism could sustain a vision of non-Westerners as 
benefactors of white guidance, at best, or perennial children in need of intervention 
at worst. Obversely, European thinkers since the Enlightenment and counter-
Enlightenment -- such as Herder, Las Casas, and Voltaire -- had argued that Europe 
should respect, or even learn from, the spiritual and cultural essences of Eastern 
cultures or indigenous Amerindians (Bailey, 1992; Todorov, 1996; Inayatullah and 
Blaney, 2004: ch. 2). A typical tendency of anti-colonial nationalist discourse in the 
late 19th and 20th centuries was to appropriate and reverse the tropes of spiritual 
richness, artistic sensibility, or rootedness in communal values. These traits were 
used as a basis for arguments that non-Westerners – because of their distinct 
histories, practices, cultures, and intellectual traditions -- had the potential to become 
even better liberals, socialists, soldiers, or moderns than Westerners (Chatterjee, 
1986: 55, 138-139). Used to defeat the legitimation scripts of exclusion and imperial 
encroachment, these arguments further associated specific qualities with Western 
and non-Western ethnicity, culture, and history.vi  
 I call this practice epistemic mapping. Epistemic mapping is a representational 
practice based on the notion that different ideas, practices, or thought systems have 
a single geographical provenance, or can be coded according to a set of particular 
social relations or embodied social subjectivities. Whereas epistemic difference was 
sometimes invoked in the late imperial context to reject the politics of assimilation 
and exclusion, epistemic mapping institutionalises particular representations of 
difference for purposes of comparison or critique.  
 Comparing the arguments of Amitav Acharya – the leading proponent of 
‘Global IR’ – with the early racial nationalist arguments of W.E.B. Du Bois, reveals 
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continuity in the imperial structure of this practice. Acharya argues that the goal of 
Global IR is to ‘subsume, rather than supplant, existing IR theories and methods’ 
(Acharya, 2014b: 649; 2016: 6). Mainstream IR should not be reconstructed, but 
augmented in various ways by the insights of the non-West (Acharya, 2014b: 650). 
This means deeper incorporation of Area Studies to add empirical breadth and depth 
(Acharya, 2014b: 655), and drawing on ‘non-Western traditions’ such as ‘Hindu epic 
literature and Buddhist philosophy’ to augment methodological practice (Acharya, 
2016: 8).  Presenting himself as a representative of the ‘non-Western World’, 
Acharya claims that the desire for ‘relative autonomy and recognition’ within the 
existing international order is more representative of the global South than those 
politics which sought or seek to transform it (Acharya, 2014a: 16).  
 Du Bois’s scholarship before 1940 was also marked by the assertion of non-
Western cultural traits, and the promotion of non-Western contributions to the global 
democratic project. His arguments emerged in opposition to both white nativist 
rhetoric in the United States (Foley, 2010: 170), and the project of global white 
supremacy, which continued to legitimate imperial rivalry and Euro-American 
‘stewardship’ of the colonies after WWI (Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Vitalis, 2015; 
Pedersen, 2015; Younis, 2017; Getachew, 2019). Du Bois’s representations of 
blackness were consistent with Lamarckian evolutionism and the Boasian turn in 
American anthropology. These academic paradigms attributed difference to 
environment and history rather than biology, and were referenced by both racists 
and anti-racists to essentialise cultural traits as a basis for policy (Reed Jr., 1997: 
120; Vitalis, 2015: ch. 2).  
  While more sophisticated than biological explanations, sociohistorical 
development still attempted to code whole groups of people according to generic 
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traits. In 1924’s the Gift of Black Folk, Du Bois devotes each chapter to a different 
contribution made by the black race to the United States and to the democratic 
forces of the world. He explains black contributions with reference to the cultural 
development of the race in relation to its African setting. Du Bois writes that ‘[t]he 
Negro is primarily an artist…. [th]e only race which had held at bay the life destroying 
forces of the tropics, has gained therefrom in some slight compensation a sense of 
beauty, particularly for sound and color, which characterizes the race’ (Du Bois, 
2014) [1924]: 104). Du Bois’s criticism of European empire during this period 
presupposed that the fates of Europe and ‘darker peoples’ were linked through 
longstanding imperial relations (Du Bois, 2016 [1920]: 23-25). Writing in 1920, Du 
Bois attributed the greatness of Europe to its ability to capitalise on non-European 
knowledge: ‘Why, then is Europe great? Because of the foundations which the 
mighty past have furnished her to build upon: the iron trade of ancient black Africa, 
the religion and empire-building of yellow Asia, the art and science of the “dago” 
Mediterranean shore’ (Du Bois 2016 [1920]: 23, italics added).  
 Although Du Bois argued that these different civilisations should follow their 
own particular historical and cultural lines of development, he also held that different 
civilisations should aspire to a world standard of civilisation. Consistent with one 
logic of imperial race development, ethnic and cultural categories such as black or 
non-Western must be preserved until the people they represent can make important 
civilisational contributions. In his pre-war and inter-war work, Du Bois appropriated 
the imperial challenge for races to prove themselves as races by re-establishing their 
own empires. Referring to pre-colonial African empires such as Songhai, Benin, and 
Mali, Du Bois argued that the black race should avoid miscegenation until it has built 
‘a great black race tradition of which the Negro and the world will be as proud in the 
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future as it has been in the ancient world’ (cited in Wolters, 2003: 158). While Du 
Bois opposed the violence and exploitation of European empire, he also envisaged 
an integrated Pan-Africa which would be built on modern standards of civilisation 
and guided by a black elite who could speak for an authentic black culture.   
 Du Bois’s practice of both defending the potential of black populations to 
become civilised, as well as defending traditional African folkways and particularities, 
stemmed from the contradictions in engaging multiple audiences within a multi-axial 
social and political order. For Du Bois, civilisation was to take place with respect to 
inherent group traits – a sentiment which appealed to dominant ideas about 
authentic African difference within the American university (see Posnock, 1997: 336) 
– but ‘postulation of an exotic black particularity’ also demonstrated the need for a 
cultured, educated black elite as ‘spokespersons’, ‘keepers and translators of the 
culture’ with respect to a dominant white constituency (Reed Jr. 1997: 58). 
Representations of African exoticism would have also appealed to some audiences 
during a moment when concern with ‘overcivilisation’ was in vogue with affluent 
metropolitan whites  
 As we will see in section three, Du Bois eventually shifted away from 
epistemic mapping towards international class consciousness and strategic anti-
imperial alliances. However, Du Bois’s pre-1940 cultural nationalism is illustrative of 
the imperial structure of the discourse. The continued prominence of cultural 
nationalist arguments in the period after WWII provides important context for Frantz 
Fanon’s aversion to the politics of imperial coexistence.           
    
Imperial dialectics and the lure of coexistence 
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Empire maintained dehumanising hierarchies of race and culture, but also created 
overtures to multicultural coexistence which could maintain imperial order by 
extending authority to colonial clients. Subverting and building on Hegel’s dialectics 
of reciprocal recognition, Fanon observed that late empire could extend formal 
equality and rights without dismantling the fundamental hierarchy of a master/slave 
relationship. ‘The White man is a master who allowed slaves to eat at his table’, 
Fanon wrote (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 194). Recognition in the imperial context did not 
necessarily mean emancipation, but could imply the extension of imperial power in 
the form of ethnic and cultural inclusion (see Coulthard, 2014).  
 Fanon’s imperial dialectics problematise the idea that a variety of different 
representations of difference can be sustained simultaneously and harnessed at will 
for different strategies (cf. Sabaratnam, 2011). This is because the deployment of ‘self 
and other’ representations helps construct the social and political reality of that ‘self 
and other’, while simultaneously negating other potentialities (Mamdani, 2012). Such 
representations are politically consequential and highly ambiguous, and so their 
reification as scholarly knowledge has to be avoided.      
 Colonialism, in the sense that Fanon confronted it, was a specific kind of war, 
where the arrestment – not necessarily the death – of native culture is a tool of 
domination. Cultural and racial chauvinism are not the primary concern of empire. 
Rather, it is the ‘gigantic business’ of ‘colonial war’ that makes ‘the enslavement… of 
the native population’ the ‘prime necessity.’ Colonial enslavement required that native 
populations’ cultural ‘systems of reference’ had to be ‘broken.’ This is not initially 
chauvinism for its own sake, but a ‘condition’ which accompanies and legitimates 
‘[e]xpropriation, spoliation, raids, objective murder’ (Fanon, 1980 [1956]: 33). 
Colonialism did not necessarily lead to the death of native culture. ‘On the contrary’, 
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Fanon wrote, it takes a culture ‘once living and open to the future’ and renders it 
‘closed, fixed in the colonial status, caught in the yoke of oppression’. Subverting 
Hegelian recognition, empire made it impossible ‘for a man to evolve otherwise than 
within the framework of a culture that recognizes him and that he decides to assume’ 
(Fanon, 1980: 34).                       
 Crucially, Fanon never advocated the reification of ethno-cultural difference as 
the best anti-imperial strategy amongst others, and he certainly did not advocate 
ontologising specific representations of difference as part of academic knowledge 
production. Because of the subjugation of non-Western cultures within the material 
and social hierarchy of empire, the mobilisation of groups which had been 
diminished by Europeans was a potent tool to reclaim power in colonised countries. 
However, in turning culture outward, the danger was that it become an inert 
celebration of itself and not drive towards its own transformation. The mobilisation of 
identity was not purely for the sake of national independence, but necessary for the 
Third World to seize power on the world stage and to chart a political and economic 
course between the West and the Soviet Union (Hudis, 2015: 80-81). Failing to 
overcome the particular as particular would mean that newly independent nations 
would likely fail to integrate into larger, unified federations, and therefore remain 
susceptible to new forms of colonialism and division. In a reply to his admirer, the 
Iranian political thinker, Ali Shariati, Fanon wrote, ‘I respect your view that in the 
Third World… Islam, more than any other social and ideological force, has had an 
anti-colonialist capacity and an anti-Western nature.’ However, he concluded, ‘I, for 
one, fear that the fact of revitalizing the spirit of sectarianism and religion may result 
in a setback for a nation that is engaged in the process of becoming, of distancing 
itself from its future and immobilizing it in its past’ (cited in Hudis, 2015: 134).    
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 Race is also (ultimately) too thin to serve as the basis for a sustainable 
revolutionary political formation. In his final work before his death, Les Damnés de la 
Terre [the Wretched of the Earth], Fanon wrote that the ‘historical necessity in which 
the men of African culture find themselves to racialize their claims and to speak more 
of African culture than of national culture will tend to lead them up a blind alley’ 
(Fanon, 1963: 172, italics added). Race reaches a limit of its ability to unify, and 
becomes subordinated to the particularities of a new international political context 
(Fanon, 1963: 173-174). It is at this stage that class politics become especially 
important, because without continued revolutionary momentum, the ruling class of 
the newly independent nation will simply reproduce the chauvinism and oppressive 
relations of the colonial administration (Fanon, 1963: 125-128). 
 None of this was purely hypothetical. When Fanon was engaged with the 
revolutionary Front de Libération Nationale during the Franco-Algerian war, he was 
surrounded by native leaders who wished to make amends with the French Empire 
on culturalist terms. For example, the first president of Senegal, Léopold Sédar 
Senghor, wished for France to fully include its African territories as part of a 
multiracial, multicultural confederation (Cooper, 2014; Wilder, 2015). Like Du Bois, 
Senghor argued for African inclusion on the grounds that Africans had distinct 
cultural virtues and intellectual traits, which were complementary rather than 
antagonistic with those of Europeans (Howe, 1999: 26). This kind of argument was 
typical, though not exhaustive, of the mid-20th century literary and political 
movement, Négritude. During the Franco-Algerian war, Fanon took aim at Senghor 
and the ‘bards of Négritude’, who, construct an ‘inventory of particularisms’ out of 
‘reified’ ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ (citied in Wilder, 2015: 134). 
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 Demarcating the non-Western as a zone of difference to be devalued or mined 
for particularisms ultimately steals the right of the global South to its share of human 
history. Fanon’s answer to this is to assert the particular as universal by rejecting the 
notion that ideas, innovations, and histories rightfully or exclusively belong to particular 
groups: ‘I am a man, and in this sense the Peloponnesian War is as much mine as the 
invention of the compass’ (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 175). Part of this means recognising 
that, although ethno-cultural identity is crucial to the struggle against empire, it is 
secondary to the political struggle which creates other forms of identity and solidarity. 
‘My black skin is not the wrapping of specific values’, Fanon writes (Fanon, 2008 
[1952]: 177). ‘Every time a man has contributed to the victory of the dignity of the spirit, 
every time a man has said no to an attempt to subjugate his fellows, I have felt 
solidarity with his act’ (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 176).   
 One of the key takeaways from this analysis of Du Bois’s and Fanon’s 
representations of difference is the overlap, but fundamental difference, between 
representation for academic praxis and representation for political/activist praxis. In 
the process of political/activist praxis, representation might take different forms 
depending on the strategic content of the dialectical response to hegemony. 
Essentialism might be condoned in these circumstances, or simply emerge as a 
reaction. However, it is not the role of academic praxis to condone essentialism, but 
to offer accounts for why or how it is possible for essentialism to take place. Yet, it is 
essentialism in academic praxis which is sometimes produced by anti-Eurocentric 
IR.           
 
Re-dividing the world  
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Epistemic mapping and anti-Eurocentric IR 
 
Like Senghor and the early Du Bois, anti-Eurocentric scholars often reproduce the 
imperial division of the world when invoking the non-Western. In emphasising 
difference, anti-Eurocentric scholars occlude access to the values, practices, or 
political projects – good or bad -- that cut across or have been shared by people in 
the global North and South. While essentialism of this kind might sometimes seem 
politically necessary -- at least in the short term – its reliability as knowledge needs 
to be more closely interrogated.  
 To an extent, the incentive structure to add alternatives in the form of non-
Western alternatives is passed down by mainstream IR theorists. For example, 
mainstream realists who have essentialised the ‘character’ of non-Western nations 
as a limit on the expansion of Western universalism (e.g. Huntington, 1997; 
Kissinger, 2014; see Reus-Smit, 2017), can provoke responses valorising non-
Western universalisms. Or mainstream realists who argue that non-Western IR can 
offer nothing that Western IR does not already (e.g. Mearsheimer, 2016) can 
provoke a proliferation of exceptions in the form of ethnic and cultural particularisms.  
 Though not all anti-Eurocentric IR scholars are equally incautious about 
epistemic mapping, it is broadly practiced and seemingly difficult to avoid. Epistemic 
mapping is brought in to offer ‘global’ or ‘post-Western’ alternatives to IR’s ‘analytical 
bifurcations’ – such as West/East, theoretical/atheoretical, subjective/objective -- but 
actually elaborates on these bifurcations.vii When Acharya points to constructivism’s 
role in ‘opening space for scholarship on the non-Western world’ because of its 
emphasis on ‘culture and Identity’ he is drawing on an older bifurcation based on the 
notion that while the West has ‘knowledge’, the non-West has ‘culture’ (Acharya, 
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2014b: 650). Similarly, Yaqing Qin (2018) reproduces a familiar stereotype about the 
West operating from a knowledge culture of ‘rationality’, whereas China operates 
from an epistemology of ‘relation.’ Robbie Shilliam has been a foremost scholar in 
pointing out the different uses of the Western, and the inherent problems of 
representing an authentic non-Western removed from colonial history (2010). 
However, in his recent work, the Black Pacific, he claims the ability (though not 
unproblematic) to speak for the lived experiences and ‘living knowledge traditions’ of 
Maori and Pasifika peoples. These living knowledge traditions, Shilliam argues, 
provide access to an epistemic alternative to ‘Western modernity’, supposedly free of 
‘Western’ hierarchy or violence (Shilliam, 2015: 7-12). These claims sometimes 
come with troubling assertions of a hegemonic national philosophy or religion as the 
basis for epistemic difference. For example, Confucianism is equated with Chinese 
in a manner which celebrates a particular representation of national identity and 
buries internal contestation and the myriad historical forces which shaped 
contemporary China. Note, for example, that Qin’s book on Chinese IR contains no 
reference to international communism or Mao Zedong as intellectual or cultural 
influences on modern China.         
 Other varieties of epistemic mapping allow for ‘hybrid’ forms of social, political, 
and economic organisation, but retain the essential origin of the individual 
components. For example, Agathangelou and Ling’s invocation of ‘Asian capitalism’, 
which they conceptualise as the result of ‘mater liberalism's consummation with the 
Confucian world-order’ creates a hybrid category out of two essentialisms (2004: 27). 
Contrast this with Fanon, who refused to concede rightful ownership of human 
knowledge to particular peoples, regions, or civilisations.  
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 The way that the debate is structured around these divisions leaves it poorly 
guarded against the double-edged valence of difference. Reduction of difference to 
ethnic and cultural categories (including European) can lead to reduction of groups 
to their worst practices, to virtuous caricatures, or disable the critiques of anyone 
seen to be outside these groups. That different societies have produced different 
cultural particularities is not in doubt; however, the meanings that intellectual origin 
claims carry are ambiguous and can be put to many different uses. Ancient Greece, 
for example, provides some of the major foundations of dominant Western thought, 
but in its historical context it had more cultural, intellectual, and political links with the 
civilisations of Asia Minor and Egypt. Both of these statements can be true, yet both 
can be emphasised in different ways for different effects (for example see, Duara, 
1996: 40; Young, 2016; 33). 
 Take the claim, sometimes obliquely made, that non-Western perspectives 
are distinct sources of cultural cohesion, spirituality, or moral insight. For example, 
Arlene Tickner’s assertion that  
modern Western belief systems are based upon an instrumental relationship 
between human beings (subject) and nature (object) that translates into the 
instrumentalisation of knowledge or the view of knowledge as a commodity. 
Instead, many non-Western cosmogonies view the self, community and nature 
as interdependent parts of a single whole, with which their understanding of the 
relationship between knowledge and the natural world, and of the social 
function of knowledge in general, is markedly different. [Tickner, 2003: 305] 
Such a claim is not only essentialist, but politically ambiguous. Imperial authorities 
made similar claims about non-Western worldviews in order to justify exclusion on 
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the grounds that ‘natives’ were ill-adept for modernity, but also to cast doubt on the 
authenticity of ‘Westernised’ native critics. It is unlikely that Tickner means to 
essentialise; however, the characterisation of the non-Western as more attuned to 
communal values and the natural world emerges from the dialectical impetus to 
define the particular non-Western against the particular Western. The definition of 
the Western as rational and universalist is also constructed, and is complicated by 
any close inspection of the variety of communitarian religious beliefs, anti-modern 
sentiment, and counter-Enlightenment philosophy within modern Europe and the 
West. On the other hand, many non-Westerners also see knowledge as a 
commodity. Commodification of knowledge is therefore not explicable purely in terms 
of ethno-cultural thought systems.           
     This raises the related point that the non-Western alternatives being defined 
need not be insular or ‘communitarian’ in order to be essentialisms. The claim is not 
that the ‘non-Western’ circumscribes too narrow a section of humanity, but that it 
carves up the world into separate realms which are coded according to some 
ingredient which defines them in contradistinction to the Western. Arguments that 
non-Westerners have their own universalisms (Acharya, 2014b: 649-650), alternative 
sources of cosmopolitanism (Munro and Shilliam, 2010), or local humanisms 
(Nakano, 2010) demonstrate that political globalism is universal, regardless of 
whether or not its universality can be evaluated as serving progressive or 
conservative, emancipatory or oppressive political aims. However, attributing specific 
global visions to a particular social or historical experience supposedly shared by 
people with the same race and culture only makes sense within a politicised 
discourse where the value of the non-Western has been somehow challenged.viii  
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 Then there are definitions of epistemic difference based on ‘lived experience.’ 
Although an improvement on territorial or raciological accounts, the ascription of 
cultural difference to a generic lived experience or social subjectivity can also reduce 
groups of people to stereotypes and monolithic value sets. This is evident in the work 
of some scholars who take Fanon primarily as a source of ‘epistemic blackness’, 
without fully addressing his concerns about racialisation and the geopolitical 
dimensions of decolonisation. For example, the philosopher Lewis R. Gordon writes 
that ‘Fanon’s body… is a subtext of all his writings…. Anxiety over embodiment is a 
dimension of Western civilization against which Fanon was in constant battle. The 
body, he laments, is a denied presence, and black people are a denied people’ 
(Gordon, 2015: 8). Even in as sophisticated an analysis of Fanon as Gordon’s, there 
is a danger of essentialism through the association of black identity with a particular 
way of thinking. For Fanon, black people were not so much universally ‘denied’ as 
relegated to certain roles within a social  hierarchy—the French empire most 
specifically. Blacks could be higher or lower status, but race was the basis for social 
relegation which alienated the subject from a full, dynamic humanity. For Fanon, 
every particular experience is an instantiation of the universal, and his analysis of his 
own experience is a demand to be recognised as a fellow human with an equal stake 
in humanity. Blackness is not a generalisable perspective from which we can derive 
a non-Western knowledge, but a reminder to pay attention to the social and historical 
specificity of relation.ix    
 Embodiment arguments are usually the vehicle for Fanon’s presence in IR, 
and are often accompanied with the claim that non-Westerners have profoundly 
different ways of practicing politics or being modern. For example, Vivienne Jabri 
(2014) invokes Fanon to theorise the ‘embodied presence’ of non-Western agency 
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within international order. Anna Agathangelou (2016) links different aspects of 
Fanon’s revolutionary dialectics to his conception of the subjugated black body. She 
is particularly interested in how Fanon’s conception of racial experience might 
present alternatives or ‘different’ ways of doing politics (Agathangelou 2016: 111; cf. 
Sekyi-Otu, 2009). In a similar argument, John M. Hobson contrasts the ‘different 
critique’ of ‘African-American Marxists’, including Du Bois, with ‘white Eurocentric 
institutional thinkers’ like Leonard Woolf (Hobson, 2012: 17, n. 20). However, the 
difference is not as stark as Hobson might hope. It is true that Woolf’s anti-racism 
was qualified by a belief in elite institutional development, but so was Du Bois’s anti-
imperialism.x Areas of overlap are thus obscured by the assumption that there are 
‘black’ and ‘white’ ideas, which can be mapped onto generic ‘black’ and ‘white’ social 
realities.  
  Aside from its dubious reliability, the problem with epistemic mapping is 
essentially the same as the problem with the ethnicised counter claims of Du Bois or 
Senghor: it is too amenable to the purposes of imperial ordering and elite 
representation. It creates and services the two worlds of Said’s orientalist divide, 
rather than building an agenda based on analytical approaches which constructively 
problematise the divide.  
 
Logics of epistemic coexistence     
 
Fanon’s concerns about imperial coexistence continue to have relevance in the way 
that anti-Eurocentric scholars represent the relationship between Western and non-
Western epistemes. Associations of Western and non-Western with specific traits 
are reinforced by scholarly prescriptions of how the two ought to interact. Anti-
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Eurocentrism is therefore an ethos as well as an analytical approach. Anti-
Eurocentric scholars tend to make arguments both in favour and against peaceful 
integration of the non-Western and the Western. Claims that the non-Western must 
make itself autonomous from the Western (e.g. Mignolo, 2009), or that non-Western 
IR must be added as a complement to Western IR to produce a more ‘inclusive and 
diverse’ discipline (e.g. Acharya, 2014; 2016) both tend to presuppose that the 
Western and non-Western exist ‘out there’ as de-contested and fixed (or, at least, 
de-contestable and fixable) realms of social and political inquiry.xi Each in its own 
way can reproduce imperial coexistence and recognition, Fanon’s ‘seat at the 
master’s table’ and Said’s orientalist division of the world.      
 Anti-Eurocentric coexistence reproduces an imperial image of the world based 
on a non-West which is spiritually rich, radically pluralist, and organically socialist, 
and a West which is hierarchical, absolutist, and secular. Anti-Eurocentric scholars 
sometimes essentialise the Western as a political and philosophical force which is 
chauvinistic at its root (e.g. Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Mignolo, 2011; Hobson, 2012). 
These approaches suggest a fundamental antagonism between Western and non-
Western, but in doing so, produce flattened images of each. It then follows that steps 
must be taken to rid or purify the non-Western of embedded Western traits. Calling 
this a promotion of coexistence may seem counter-intuitive. Mignolo, for example, is 
certainly very critical of the Western, and extrapolates from this a professed desire 
for a different world. However, his critique comes with the assumption that the 
Western cannot or should not be transformed in any fundamental way. Rather, the 
Western is fixed and essentialised as an object of binary opposition. New 
universalisms of pluralism and horizontality must be derived from non-Western 
24 
 
thought systems, putting the Western in its place and leaving it alone (although, see 
Rojas, 2016). 
 Alternatively, scholars who favour non-Western diversification of social and 
political inquiry sometimes argue that purportedly ‘non-Western’ traits, such as 
‘relationality’, can be added to ‘the Western’ in order to act as a mediating force on 
‘its’ violence. Coexistence here is not only the prescribed mode of interaction, but it 
is the contribution that non-Western culture is making to the discipline. These 
scholars recognise conflict between West and non-West, but often downplay or 
ignore the power dynamics and structural inequalities within representations of 
Western and non-Western. Take Ling’s Daoist dialectics, which, though it makes the 
valuable offer of liminal identities between East and West, nevertheless reinscribes 
the divide by assigning ownership of relational conceptions to non-Western thought 
systems. Ling writes that Western political ‘common sense’ offers only intellectual 
resources for violence towards difference, not for recognition and negotiation (Ling, 
2013: 12, 15). Strategies for negotiation – perhaps for any constructive, mutually-
affirming political relations -- must therefore be taken from non-Western thought 
systems, such as Daoism and the yin/yang. She does not convey ‘hegemony, 
hierarchy, and violence’ as endemic to many societies across space and time, but 
‘enactments’ of the dominant Western picture of the world. But for its many evils, the 
Western should not be subsumed, but balanced by the ‘parity, fluidity, and ethics’ 
offered by ‘other worlds’ (Ling, 2013: 14). Here, war and peace become 
fundamentally questions of attitude towards cultural or racial difference, not 
structurally determined results of historical inequality within and between societies.    
 Another potential pitfall of the ethos of coexistence is that it elicits an open-
ended demand for a proliferation of ‘different’ perspectives, removed from the 
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sociohistorical contexts wherein these perspectives gain meaning. The non-Western 
can thus become a kind of global ‘pick and mix’ for epistemic diversification or 
institutional strategy, and the specific, dialectical relations which elicit 
representations of the non-Western are broadly passed over. Unearthing different 
perspectives either becomes a virtue in itself – in the name of diversification – or as 
a means of retrieving perspectives which will grant greater ‘openness’ (Bilgin, 2016: 
137-138; e.g. Grovogui, 2009: 138). This is, of course, not to say that greater 
openness and diversity would necessarily be undesirable. However, without a 
complementary impetus to assess these perspectives for their ability to produce or 
impede a more just society, let alone whether they are that ‘different’ to begin with, 
the politics of pluralisation are obscured (see Eun, 2019; Paipais, 2016).  
 There is thus a danger in depoliticising difference when making absolute 
virtues out of diversity and openness. While calls for diversity might be politically 
constructive, scholars should not advocate a plurality of representations of difference 
without rigorous critical analysis of those representations. Edward Said, in the same 
vein as Fanon, wrote from an analytical perspective which was highly conscious of 
geopolitical imperialism, and thus critical of certain ‘non-Western’ perspectives – e.g. 
‘nativism’ – which he saw as detrimental to the political project of decolonisation 
(1993: 275-278). While he acknowledged that the non-West could not be reduced to 
an inferior or ‘backwards’ reflection of the West, he also did not support the 
coexistence of analytical approaches which reify non-Western difference 
(orientalism) and those that treat it as a discursive and material construct. This is 
because he knew that, while not the same as political praxis, academic knowledge 
has the power to shape the social world it studies, and can thus reproduce the 
imperial division of the world and attendant political agendas.     
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Dynamic difference and strategic knowledge 
 
Not without reason, critics of Eurocentrism frequently call on Du Bois and Fanon as 
defenders of non-Western difference. However, as I have suggested, they tend to 
read them first as ‘non-Western’ thinkers, rather than as anti-imperial thinkers. In 
other words, they read them first as representatives of an ethnic or cultural 
perspective, rather than a political perspective. While culture and politics are not 
mutually exclusive, reduction of politics to culture can lead to flattened conceptions 
of the multi-axial and dynamic social worlds in which theory is produced. A correction 
to this can be made by emphasising the turn away from racialisation that both Du 
Bois and Fanon made in their later lives. Rather than an awakening to perspectives 
which were abstractly ‘more correct’, shifts in Du Bois’s and Fanon’s thought were 
embedded in the changing dynamics of relation which were part and parcel of the 
increasingly globalised confrontation with European empire. The takeaway here is 
not to abandon essentialised categories of ethno-cultural difference only to replace 
them with other political or identity categories, but to shift our analysis to the 
processes in which difference claims become viable and significant.      
 Du Bois and Fanon engaged with empire and colonialism as a transnational 
field of political action. The early to mid-twentieth century saw what Branwen Gruffyd 
Jones calls an ‘emergence of connected struggles and shared consciousness’ 
(2010). Anti-imperial leaders learned from and contributed to a ‘global canon of anti-
colonial and revolutionary thought and experience’, which included diaspora 
activists, nationalists, anarchists, Marxists, and many others from around the world 
(2010: 55, italics in original). After the Second World War, Du Bois and Fanon 
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promoted internationalism and cultural revolution -- not valorisation of the non-
Western -- as means to end imperialism.  
 After 1940, Du Bois came to advocate an alliance of shared political aims over 
ethnic and cultural nationalism. Although Du Bois was never entirely blind to class, 
and he recognised the political potential of proletarian revolution earlier (Horne, 
1986; Henderson, 2015), the global ‘colour line’ was his predominant focus 
throughout the pre-war and inter-war periods. However, from 1940 on, Du Bois 
gradually shifted the ethno-cultural focus of his anti-imperialism towards a focus on 
international class consciousness and political unity. Rather than representative of a 
mainstream trend, the shift helped to marginalise Du Bois within the American Civil 
Rights movement and get him into trouble with the United States government 
(Horne, 1986; Gao, 2013: 64). Du Bois expanded his conception of ethno-cultural 
development to draw several different cultures and races together. He wrote that 
‘physical’ kinship is ‘least’ significant, and ‘the badge of color relatively unimportant 
save as a badge.’ ‘The real essence’ of racial kinship, he wrote, ‘is its social heritage 
of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply 
the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas’ (Du 
Bois, 1996: 640).  
 However, ‘the social heritage of slavery’ was not an invitation to flatten and 
codify the non-Western and promote its alternative universalisms. Following Japan’s 
defeat in the Second World War, Du Bois pointed to Japan’s imperialism in Asia as 
the cause of its downfall. He stressed the ‘structural limitations of racialist and 
nationalist opinion’ as giving oxygen to non-Western imperialism (Gao, 2013: 63).xii 
His advocacy of transnational and interracial solidarity based on anti-imperial 
democracy deepened following a visit to communist China in 1959. In his preface to 
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the Chinese translation of the Souls of Black Folk in 1959, Du Bois intimated that ‘the 
color line was now less important than class consciousness’ (Gao, 2013: 75). This 
was not exclusively a clarion call to non-white multitudes, but promotion of a 
strategic alliance of anti-imperial forces. During his visit, Du Bois also called on 
China to align itself with the United States and Russia: states he saw as being forces 
for anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in world politics (Gao, 2013: 63). That a 
closer or more detached assessment might have proved the United States and 
Russia unworthy of Du Bois’s endorsement is beside the point: political goals, at 
least in the current conjuncture, mattered more than ethno-cultural identity. 
 Fanon, in some ways subsuming Du Bois, was even less ambiguous: ethnic 
and cultural foundations for politics are stumbling blocks to the revolutionary 
momentum needed to confront imperialism. Take a portion of a speech delivered by 
Fanon in 1958 at the All-African Peoples’ Conference in the newly independent 
Ghana: 
 
An African’s anticolonialism, even when already independent, cannot be reduced 
to staking out a moral position. Each African is an anticolonialist soldier and we 
well know that, in certain circumstances, we do not have the choice of arms. The 
African’s anticolonialism is a combatant anticolonialism and not a realm of ethnic 
awareness – the Belgian, English or French colonialists must get used to seeing 
each African as an unremitting enemy of their domination in Africa. [Fanon, 2018: 
636]  
 
National consciousness, which, Fanon insists ‘is not nationalism’, is the vehicle for 
entry into a decolonised international (see also Jabri, 2012). National consciousness 
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is not an expression of the ‘reified’, ‘traditional’ culture of indirect rule, but a new inter-
cultural, inter-class identity formed out of empire’s collapse and anti-imperial 
resistance (Fanon, 1963: 190-199). It is through the process of organised resistance 
against dominant culture – both imperial and ‘native’ – that new emancipatory 
identities emerge. Fanon imagines that these processes will or should lead to the 
‘break-up of the old strata of culture’ (1963: 197). They must also be driven by the 
popular will of the masses, and not by elite fiat (1963: 198).   
 The anti-imperial struggle necessitated an image of the colonised sharing ‘the 
stage of history’ with the rest of the world, and not sanctifying a local perspective of 
history (1963: 199). Fanon argued that individual colonies in Africa and the 
Caribbean should retain their individual sovereignty until they can form ‘a 
confederation of mature states, determined to help each other and to defend each 
other’s freedom’ (2018: 589). Thus, the basis of ‘African-Negro’ national 
consciousness is not race politics, but the result of a geopolitical condition: ‘every 
independent nation in an Africa where colonialism is still entrenched is an encircled 
nation, a nation which is fragile and in permanent danger’ (1963: 199). The shared 
national consciousness of Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, or Angola is not the unity 
symbolised by race, but the unity created by imperialist threat and anti-imperial 
resistance (1963: 170-174). This is fundamentally a multi-racial project: ‘the concept 
of Africa for the Africans does not mean that other races are excluded…. We 
struggle for the future of humanity and it is a most important struggle’ (Fanon, 2018: 
656, italics added). 
 Thus, Fanon’s anti-imperialism was not a valorisation of a particular 
universalism, but an assertion of the particular as universal. Fanon called the 
anticolonial struggle a ‘messy original idea propounded as an absolute’ (Fanon, 1961: 
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44). The original idea is the ideological current which emerges from within the 
movement for the movement, but the movement takes place within a network of other 
movements all driven by the absolute demand for freedom from imperial rule (Gibson, 
2011: xii). Of course, as in the case of a Senghor, freedom from empire was not a 
universally felt demand. Rather, Fanon’s appeal to the absolute is a political rallying 
cry, meant to mobilise a transnational cohort of freedom fighters. It is theory meant to 
inspire political action across the globe, not an academic elaboration of a particular 
episteme. 
 Anti-imperial internationalism and cultural revolution continued to form the basis 
for political projects in Africa and beyond after the deaths of Fanon and Du Bois (e.g. 
Gibson 2011).xiii Amílcar Cabral’s revolt against the Portuguese colonial state was 
characterised by a call for African cultural renewal and an appeal to the international 
community to enshrine and enforce anti-imperial values (Cabral, 2016: 115-120; see 
Jones, 2010). Addressing the United Nations in 1962 as an ‘anonymous soldier for the 
United Nations’, Cabral urged ‘the United Nations and the anti-colonialist states and 
organizations – all forces of peace in the world’ to ‘take concrete action against the 
Portuguese state’ (cited in Shepard, 2014: 151). The Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa 
Thiong'o, an admirer of Fanon and Cabral, made a similar speech to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 2009. In it, he argued in favour of limited 
international intervention as long as it was not a front for imperialism (Ngũgĩ, 2009: 1-
6). Ngũgĩ was previously incarcerated for his criticism of Jomo Kenyatta’s government 
in the late 1970s (see Ngũgĩ, 1981). Although Ngũgĩ remains a proponent of African 
language and culture to this day, his Marxist internationalism was at loggerheads with 
the post-colonial cultural nationalism which still serves as a camouflage to ongoing 
imperial relations and designs. 
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 This reading runs contrary to readings which characterise Fanon as 
‘strategically ambivalent’ on questions of identity or nationalism (e.g. Bell, 2013b; 
Rao, 2017). Fanon’s strategy was not ambivalent, but dialectical. Certain 
conjunctures in the relationship between coloniser/colonised, white/non-white, 
West/non-West elicited certain representations which appeared strategically 
necessary. To a reiterate a point made earlier, Fanon never advocated strategic 
essentialism of non-Western culture as the best of a range of options. Essentialised 
self-representation emerges as a dialectical response to colonial domination which 
must be surpassed. The role of the scholar should be to understand and explain 
these processes of representation, not reproduce particular representations as 
flattened, transhistorical realities.    
  
Conclusion 
 
While not suggesting one path forward, these histories attest to the need to move 
beyond the Western/non-Western division of the world in our scholarly ontologies. If 
IR intends to become a ‘global’ discipline – whatever this might mean – it cannot do 
so at the risk of continuing to reproduce imperial stereotypes about human 
difference. Of course, the specific disciplinary, institutional, and departmental 
contexts wherein ontologies are authorised and negotiated are unlikely to submit to 
an absolute, universal rejection of Western/non-Western. Incentives to diversify 
curricula and the persistence of imperial hierarchies in contemporary societies are 
likely to keep these categories around for a long time. This does not mean that 
scholars cannot run parallel programmes to disrupt essentialist representations of 
Western and non-Western. Instead of promoting ethnification, globalising the 
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discipline could suggest a move towards different categories which emphasise the 
different ways human groups intersect; for example, internationally-connected 
processes, strategic or affective alliances, or the inter-societal co-constitution of 
ideologies, practices, and social transformations (e.g. Rosenberg, 2006; Go and 
Lawson, 2017; Barkawi and Lawson, 2017). Such a shift would recognise the 
porousness of the institutions/society divide in order to keep in frame the political 
consequences of our categories. At the same time it would maintain the difference 
between academic praxis and political/activist praxis in order to keep analytical 
distance from the forms of representation elicited by social and political struggle.   
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Notes  
i  For aesthetic reasons I have limited the use of scare quotes around Western, non-Western, native, black, 
white and their variants, but do use them periodically to emphasise the contested character of these terms.   
 
ii For example, Amitav Acharya (2016: 4, n. 1) briefly references the limitations of the binary in a footnote, and 
then appears to sidestep this concern in favour of a detailed argument for the inclusion of the non-Western. 
His collaborator, Barry Buzan (2016: 157) makes a related argument that non-Western national schools – 
though potentially problematic -- must be embraced in the short term, as they are a necessary step to 
delivering ‘global IR.’   
 
iii Acharya expresses the need to avoid ‘exceptionalism’ because of its association with authoritarian politics 
(2014: 651). However, the way that his argument is structured around ethno-cultural contributions, rather 
than non-ethnic, non-cultural alternatives, necessitates exceptionalist arguments. The binary structure of the 
discourse forces a question: If the non-Western does not provide exceptions to the Western, than what is its 
distinctive contribution?     
 
iv The ‘wilful forgetting’ of empire by IR is acknowledged by Schmidt in Long and Schmidt (2005). Similar 
critiques of this omission are raised by, inter alia, Jones (2006) and Barkawi (2010). The most famous critique 
of IR as an American social science is, of course, Stanley Hoffmann’s (1977).     
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v Aydin (2007), in particular, demonstrates that the category of ‘the West’ in its current form was largely 
constructed by Asian intellectuals during imperial legitimacy crises. Of course, there is also a Cold War 
connotation, amongst others dating back even further (see Williams, 1976: 333-334).  
 
vi For a more thorough discussion of the cultural dimensions of anti-imperial resistance, see Said (1993: 230-
340).  
 
vii For critiques of ‘analytical bifurcations’ in IR, see Hutchings, 2011; Krishna 2015: 139; Go and Lawson, 2017. 
 
viii For a similar critique see Vitalis (2013). Provocatively, Vitalis argues that political and economic 
entanglements – not race or non-Western identity -- are more robust in explaining the ‘solidarity’ of anti-
imperial elites who attended the Bandung conference of 1955 (compare to Pham and Shilliam, 2016).    
 
ix Fanon explicitly made this point in an unfavourable review of Richard Wright’s book White man, listen! (in 
Fanon, 2018).  
 
x This was a view that Du Bois retained even after his turn to communism post-WWII. Compare Du Bois (1970 
[1919]) and Du Bois (1945).   
 
xi Claims that Western IR is already theoretically diverse enough without the contributions of the non-Western 
essentialise as well (e.g. Mearsheimer, 2016), but here I am only addressing anti-Eurocentric arguments. 
 
xii However, Henderson (2017) observes that Du Bois theorised a link between chauvinistic nationalism and 
racialised imperialism at least ten years earlier.   
 
xiii I do not mean to suggest that Du Bois or Fanon invented internationalism as an anti-imperial sentiment. 
There are, of course, examples which predate and/or emerge from other contexts. See, for example; 
Jayawardena, 2016 [1986]; Edwards, 2009; Jones, 2010; Rao, 2010; Sluga, 2013; Makalani, 2011.   
